1. McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1 DCA 1998), rev. den., 718 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1998). Amicus author: Prof. Michael Masinter (jointly sponsored by ACLU of Florida). Plaintiff’s counsel: Richard E. Johnson.

Trial court declared unconstitutional section of Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 restricting plaintiff’s access to court if FCHR issues a “no cause” finding within 180 days. Statute violates due process, equal protection, access to courts. First District reversed. Supreme Court denied review.

2. The Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2000). Amicus authors: Catherine A. Kyres and Richard E. Johnson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Keith Mitnick.

Florida Supreme Court established that liberal construction of this remedial law trumps the principle of strict construction of laws contrary to the common law. The writing and oath requirements of the statute apply only to one of the three forms of whistleblower conduct, not all three. The Supreme Court opinion appeared to rely heavily on the NELA brief.

3. Barnett v. Doctors & Associates, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (11 Cir. ____). Amicus author: Prof. Michael Masinter (jointly sponsored with ACLU of Florida). Plaintiff’s counsel: Bruce Rogow.

Unsuccessful appeal of sanctions against NELA member Neil Chonin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

4. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2000), overruling, Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4 DCA 1996). Amicus authors: Cynthia Sass and Gail Flatow. Plaintiff’s counsel: Gary Printy.

Florida Supreme Court establishes that where FCHR fails to make a determination within 180 days under Chapter 760, a four-year statute of limitation applies, not a limitation period of 545 days from the filing of the FCHR charge. Court further emphasizes statutory requirement of liberal construction such that wherever possible the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 should be read in the way that promotes access to the remedy.

5. Klonis v. Department of Revenue, 766 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1 DCA 2000). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Marie Mattox.

Appeals court squelched the claim of the State of Florida that it enjoyed sovereign immunity from Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 because Legislature had not used words such as “sovereign immunity is hereby waived” but had instead merely identified State of Florida as possible defendant. Several trial courts had accepted the State’s argument.

6. Dawkins v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 53 F. Supp.2d 1356 (M.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 247 F.3d 245 (11 Cir. 2001) (table). Amicus counsel: Tad Delegal. Plaintiff’s counsel: Merette Oweis.

The trial court held that a determination of “unable to conclude” from EEOC was tantamount to a determination of “no cause” from FCHR. The 11 Circuit declined to reach this issue in its unpublished opinion. The issue was later resolved in our favor. See Woodham, below.

7. Cisko v. Phoenix Medical Products, 797 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), rev. den., 839 So.2d 699 (Fla. 2003) (table) . Amicus counsel: Archibald J. Thomas, III. Plaintiff’s counsel: Douglas Wilson.

Held that an EEOC “unable to conclude” disposition can not take the place of an FCHR “no cause” determination because it does not inform the charging party of rights under Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 or what options are available under the state act. Also illustrates a practical and explicit application of the Joshua principle of liberal construction.

8. Norelus v. Denny’s, Inc., 2004 WL 1753313 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2004). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson (jointly sponsored with ACLU of Florida). Plaintiff’s counsel: TBA. No brief filed.

This case was approved for amicus participation in 2000, when Judge Lenard of the Southern District was expected to approve a magistrate judge’s order that she had directed to be entered. The magistrate judge’s order imposed massive sanctions on NELA members Karen and William Amlong under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The appealable order finally issued in July, 2004, affirming massive sanctions. In the intervening four years, Florida NELA and National NELA agreed that Florida NELA would no longer conduct amicus activity on federal issues in federal courts. There were also failures of communication on timing of the appeal. Case is pending before the 11th Circuit.

9. Williams v. Southeast Florida Cable, Inc., 782 So.2d 988 (Fla. 4 DCA 2001). Amicus counsel: Cynthia Sass and Gail Flatow. Plaintiff’s counsel: Jeanne Brady.

Our Joshua team submitted the same brief in this then-pending case. After the Supreme Court decided Joshua, the 4 DCA used this case as a vehicle for repudiation of its own Milano opinion.

10. Ginsberg and Scarfo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 156 (Fla. 2003). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson and Carol Swanson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Martha Chapman, Robert Weisberg.

This long-running case with an extremely complex history came to the Florida Supreme Court, where it was certified by the Eleventh Circuit. It got into the federal system after being removed from the state system and then came back before the state supreme court on very different issues, one of which was whether the common law tort of invasion of privacy by physical intrusion can include offensive touching of the body of the plaintiff. It was on this issue only (of the many issues in the case) that Florida NELA expressed an opinion. We were surprised that the court ruled against our position.

11. Chapman v. Laitner, 809 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Frank Shooster.

In this case, a trial judge illegally applied a Florida offer of judgment statute to a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 3d DCA reversed, largely for the reasons argued in our brief.

12. Poer v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 775 So.2d 970 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), rev. dism’d 823 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2002). Amicus counsel: William R. Amlong. Plaintiff’s counsel Bruce Botsford.

In this case the 3d DCA held that EEOC’s loss in a federal court on the plaintiff’s behalf collaterally estopped the plaintiff from litigating related issues in state court under state law. This conflicted with a decision of another district court, Andujar v. National Property & Casualty Underwriters, 659 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The Supreme Court granted review, we submitted our brief, the Court dismissed jurisdiction, the case was never decided.

13. Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So.2d 891 (Fla. 2002). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson and Archibald J. Thomas, III. Plaintiff’s counsel: Lisa Fletcher-Kemp and Gary Printy.

This was arguably the most important case in the history of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Court resolved three important issues. First, an “unable to conclude” finding from EEOC can not bind FCHR and is not a decision of FCHR. The statutory due process rights of charging parties must be strictly observed. Second, after the right to sue under 760 vests on day 180, it may not thereafter be revoked by any administrative agency. Third, the Court reaffirmed even more strongly the notion that the statute means what it says in interpreting all potential issues of law in a fashion that grants the most access to the remedy.

14. Farmer v. United Space Alliance and Lockheed Martin Space Operations Co., Case No. 02-12966J (11 Cir. 2002). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Adrienne Trent.

A U.S. District Court erroneously applied the state proposal for settlement (offer of judgment) statute to claims arising under Title VII and Chapter 760. After full briefing to the 11th Circuit, the case settled.

15. Bach v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 837 So.2d 395 (Fla. 2002) Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Stacy Strolla.

Though this case was appealed separately, the Supreme Court decided it by name in its Woodham opinion. Accordingly, the cited opinion is just a paragraph. One must read Woodham to see Bach discussed. The main issue in Bach was whether a “no cause” finding after 180 days could have any preclusive effect on the right to sue under state law. It can not.

16. Dahl v. Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives Foundation, Inc., 843 So.2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003. Amicus author: Fredrick Ford. Plaintiff’s counsel: Karen Amlong.

State funded private entities like this Defendant may be sued under either the public or the private whistleblower act. The trial court erroneously ruled they must be sued under the public whistleblower’s act. The appeals court overturned, establishing the legal interpretation we had advocated.

17. Bearelly v. Department of Corrections, 2002 WL 982429, 88 FEP Cases 1333 (Fla. 8th Cir.Ct. Union County Apr 10, 2002), aff’d, 845 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1 DCA 2003) (table). Amicus counsel: John C. Davis. Plaintiff’s counsel: Archibald J. Thomas, III.

Here the trial court ruled that a plaintiff under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 must give statutory notice under § 768.28 where the defendant is a governmental entity. The 1 DCA issued an opinion “per curiam affirmed.” Overruled by Maggio, below.

18. Bruner v. GC-GW, Inc., d/b/a Jackson-Cook, 880 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Amicus counsel: Richard E. Johnson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Vernon T. Grizzard.

Appeals court closely tracked argument of Florida NELA amicus brief in ruling for employee. New employer fired employee because he had filed worker’s compensation claim against old employer, making him a worker’s comp risk. Trial judge ruled that § 440.205 does not protect against firing by the new employer, only against the employer against whom the claim was filed. Appeals court held that employer may not take adverse action against employee for filing worker’s comp claim, no matter what company it is against.

19. Snow v. Ruden, McCloskey, Smith, Shuster, & Russell, P.A., 896 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Amicus counsel: Jill Schwartz. Plaintiff’s counsel: Karen Amlong.

Associate attorney fired by firm because she reported illegal and unethical conduct of supervising partner to Bar. Trial court ruled that private whistleblower act does not apply because Bar’s ethics rules are not a “law, rule, or regulation” within the meaning of the statute. Appeals court affirmed.

20. Martinez v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 891 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Amicus counsel: Douglas L. Wilson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Craig L. Berman.

The trial court dismissed a claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act because the charge was not notarized. The charge was filed with EEOC and met that agency’s requirements. The court refused to accept the amicus brief of Florida NELA, the first court ever to do so. Appeals court reversed, holding, first, that employer waived verification issue by saving it for court rather than raising it in administrative phase, and second, that un-notarized declaration under penalty of perjury suffices under Florida law even absent language stating charging party read charge. Declaring statement true under penalty of perjury assumes reading it or having it read to signor.

21. Pagan v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 891 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Amicus counsel: Douglas L. Wilson. Plaintiff’s counsel: Craig L. Berman.

Identical scenario with Martinez, above. This time we submitted a motion for leave to file the brief well ahead of the deadline without including the brief. The court again denied the motion for leave to file an amicus brief. Appeals court reached same result as in Martinez, above, specifically incorporating that opinion.

22. Maggio v. Florida Department Of Labor & Employment Security, 899 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2005). Amicus counsel: John C. Davis. Plaintiff’s counsel: Gary L. Printy.

Florida Supreme Court held that Florida Civil Rights Act has its own exhaustion scheme and contains its own separate waiver of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, § 768.28, Florida Statutes, does not impose further pre-suit requirements on FCRA plaintiffs and does not otherwise apply to FCRA except to the extent expressly incorporated for caps on damages.

23. Schmigel v. Cumbie Concrete Co., 903 So. 2d 195 (1st DCA 2005) (table). Amicus Counsel: Craig L. Berman. Plaintiff’s counsel: Marie A. Mattox.

Trial court held that under the Florida Whistleblower Act, § 448.101-105, Florida Statutes, a plaintiff must prove an actual violation by the employer of a law, rule or regulation. A good faith belief by the employee is not good enough. Per curiam affirmed. No opinion, no precedent.

24. Gallagher v. Manatee County, Case No. _____ (2d DCA pending). Amicus counsel: Frederick W. Ford. Plaintiff’s counsel: Kendra Presswood.

Trial court held that the damage cap of § 760.11(5) limits all monetary relief, including attorney’s fees, back pay, front pay, etc., not just emotional distress damages.

25. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Reddick, ____________ (1st DCA pending). Amicus counsel: Kendra D. Presswood. Plaintiff’s Counsel: Tad Delegal.

Trial court granted a fee multiplier under Florida Civil Rights Act. Winn-Dixie makes various arguments alleging fee multipliers are not allowed.